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Russell: Criminal Procedure: Prosecutorial Cart Blanch in the Plea Bargain

CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PROSECUTORIAL CARTE BLANCHE
IN THE PLEA BARGAIN PROCESS"
Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978)
Respondent was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on the charge of uttering a forged instrument.' Subsequently, the accused, his retained counsel and
the prosecutor engaged in plea negotiations. The prosecutor offered to recommend a five year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.2 Additionally, he
proposed to seek an enhanced indictment under the Kentucky habitual offender statute if the respondent refused to plead guilty and "save the court the
inconvenience and necessity of a trial."3 Upon the respondent's rejection of the
offer the prosecutor sought and obtained the additional habitual offender
indictment. At trial, the jury found the respondent guilty of the principal
charge, and in a subsequent proceeding imposed a life sentence upon him after
a determination that he had been convicted of two prior felonies.4 The KenOEDrroR's NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the Spring 1978 quarter.
1. At the time of respondent's indictment, this offense was punishable by a term of two
to ten years in prison. KY. REv. STAT. §434.130 (repealed 1974). The forged instrument involved in the instant case was a check in the amount of $88.30. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98
S. Ct. 663, 665 (1978).
2. The following comment was made with regard to this offer: "I observe, at this point,
that five years in prison for the offense charged hardly could be characterized as a generous
offer." 98 S. Ct. at 671 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3. 98 S. Ct. at 663. The petitioner's brief quotes the prosecutor as describing the transaction in the following manner: "Isn't it a fact that I told you at the time [of the initial
bargaining session] that if you did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge and
... save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial that I intended to return to the
grand jury and ask them to indict you based upon these prior felony convictions?" Id. at
665. See also Brief for Petitioner at 4. This description is particularly relevant because it was
included in the petitioner's brief, rather than that of the respondent, in which it might be
expected to appear. Throughout the course of the instant case, the state made no effort to
disguise or impute any motive other than vindictiveness to the prosecutor. "In this case a
vindictive motive need not be inferred. The prosecutor has admitted it." Hayes v. Cowan,
547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976), reved sub nom., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978).
(Cowan was the warden of the prison in which respondent, Hayes, was jailed. Bordenkircher
was the superintendent of the Kentucky State Penitentiary.)
4. The applicable statute was KY. REv. STAT. §434.190 (repealed 1975). This statute
provided: "[I]f ,convicted a third time of felony he shall be confined in the penitentiary
during his life. Judgment in such cases shall not be given for the increased penalty unless
the jury finds from the record and other competent evidence the fact of former convictions
for felony committed by the prisoner in or out of state." This statute has since been repealed
and replaced by KY. REv. STAT. §532.080 (Supp. 1977). The new statute replaces the prior
mandatory life sentence with an indeterminate term of ten to twenty years in prison. Ky. Rv.
STAT. §532.080(6)(b) (Supp. 1977). It also requires previous convictions to have occurred after
the accused has reached the age of majority, and the last sentence served by the accused to
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tucky Court of Appeals denied respondent's motion to vacate this judgment.5
The respondent then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus which was denied
by the district court.6 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, basing its decision on a determination that prosecutorial vindictiveness was an affront to due process On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and HELD, the prosecutor does not violate due process by
subsequently seeking an enhanced indictment, under an habitual offender
statute, against a defendant who refuses a plea bargain offer.8

Although historically looked upon with disfavor," plea bargaining in recent
years has gained increasing judicial acceptance. In 1970, the Supreme Court
dispelled any doubts about the procedure's constitutionality with the famous
"plea bargain trilogy" 10 in which the inherent power of the prosecutor to

negotiate for guilty pleas was established. In recent cases the Court has recognized that plea bargaining has become an integral component of the criminal
justice system." The entrenched and generally unchallenged nature of prose-

cutorial discretion,12 together with the newly acquired visibility and judicial
acceptance of plea bargaining, 3 has resulted in a paucity of case law challenging prosecutorial discretion in the plea bargain framework. Consequently,

have ended within the last five years. Ky. Rav. STAT. §532.080(2)(a), (2)(c)(1) (Supp. 1977).
Under this law, the respondent in the instant case would not be eligible for enhanced
sentencing because one of his prior offenses was committed while he was a juvenile. 98 S. Ct.
at 665, n. 2.
5. 98 S. Ct. at 666. In an unpublished opinion the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that
the enhanced sentence was constitutionally permissible and that the threat to reindict was a
legitimate use of prosecutorial charging discretion. Id.
6. Id. In an unreported opinion, the United States District Court for the Eastern Districf of Kentucky agreed with the state court, finding no constitutional infirmity in either
sentence or indictment. Id.
7. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976). See generally Comment, 7 MEM. ST. L.
Ray. 703 (1977).
8. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
9. In the early history of this country, pleas )of guilty were actively discouraged and
considered to be unreliable indicators of actual guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 1 D.C.
Cir. (1 Cranch) 414 (1807) (court refused to accept defendant's guilty plea); Wight v.
Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344 (1877) (trial is the safest test of actual guilt). This belief has been
gradually altered, but as late as 1957 it was generally believed that "[j]ustice and liberty are
not the subjects for bargaining and barter." Shelton v. United States, 242 F-2d 101, 113 (5th
Cir. 1957). See generally Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal
Process, 90 HAxv. L. Rxv. 564 (1977).
10. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
11. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (plea bargaining is "an
essential component in the administration of criminal justice .... [P]roperly administered,
it is to be encouraged."). To some observers, however, the plea bargaining process simply
makes nonsense of the entire law of procedural due process. This point of view is forcefully
stated in Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970).
"[P]lea bargaining systematically undermines these protections [due process rights], substituting administrative determination of guilt for the decisions of judge and jury." Id. at 1395.
12. See notes 15-19 infra and accompanying-text.
13. -See notes 9-11 supra'andaccompanying text. -
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the constitutional limitations in this area are not yet clearly defined. 1 Besides
the relatively recent acceptance of plea bargaining, judicial reluctance to inquire into prosecutorial motivation has also contributed to uncertainty in this
area of the law.'15 To a large extent, this reluctance is predicated upon the
established nature of prosecutorial discretion.' 6 This discretion is the product
not only of common law tradition7 but also of broad statutes describing the
duties of the prosecutor.' Moreover, criminal laws which provide common
elements in the definition of substantive offenses give an inherent charging
discretion to the prosecutor. 9 As a result, only situations indicating the potential for grave prejudice to a defendant have prompted judicial inquiry into
2
prosecutorial motivations. 0
Mooney v. Holohan2l is an early leading case advocating judicial review of
prosecutorial conduct. 2 2 The conviction in that case was obtained by the

prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony and his intentional suppression
of other evidence that would have impeached the perjured testimony.2" In
that case, the Supreme Court found that use of perjured testimony by the
prosecutor constituted extreme circumstances that were sufficient to establish
a denial of due process. 24 This reasoning was extended in Brady v. Maryland25
to the negligent suppression of evidence by the prosecutor. 26 The Court in
Brady further determined that the objective of a prosecutor was not merely to
27
convict but also to treat the accused with fairness.
Two recent Supreme Court cases have limited the exercise of official discretion in proceedings subsequent to a defendant's successful collateral attack on
his original conviction. In North Carolinav. Pearce'2 the appellant received a
14. "And broad though that discretion may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional
limits upon its exercise." 98 S. Ct. at 669.
15. See generally Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion-A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretion and Its Potentialfor Abuse, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 485 (1971).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §547 (1966). FLA. STAT. §27.02 (1977).
19. The substantive criminal offense of homicide is an excellent example of this type of
inherent discretion. The prosecutor may, according to his view of the crime, indict for
murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, felony murder, voluntary homicide,
or involuntary homicide. The prosecutor also makes the initial judgment that the act was in
fact a homicide and not an excusable or justifiable killing. See generally Alschuler, The
Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. Cm. L. REV. 50 (1968).
20. See text accompanying notes 21-26 infra.
21. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
22. Id. at 112.
23. Id. at 110.
24. Id. at 112.
25. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26. Id. at 87.
27. Id.
28. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). This case and Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), were relied
upon by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in reversing the respondent's conviction in the
instant case. Hayes v. Cowan, 5,7 F.2d 42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976). For a complete discussion of
enhanced sentencing pursuant to an exercise of procedural rights ("upping the ante," as
used in Pearce and Blackledge), see Note, Upping the Ante Against the Defendant Who
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more severe sentence after such a successful collateral attack. The Court held
that persons who assert their procedural rights must be free from fear of retaliatory actions. Accordingly, a retrial could result in a more severe penalty
only upon a valid showing of justification by the court. 29 The reasoning of
Pearce was expanded in Blackledge v. Perry30 to cover the recharging function
of the prosecutor. In Blackledge the accused asserted his procedural right to a
trial de novo in the state superior court.31 The prosecutor at the second trial
changed the original misdemeanor charge, assault with a deadly weapon, to a
felony offense, assult with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict serious bodily
injury.32 The defendant pleaded guilty to the felony charge. Overturning the
conviction, the Supreme Court held that prosecutorial inhibition of the defendant's exercise of procedural rights did not comport with due process. 33
The Court stated that this type of prosecutorial conduct, if allowed, would
permit the state to violate due process and ensure that only "the most hardy
defendants would brave the hazards" of asserting their procedural rights.3 '
The rationale utilized by the Supreme Court in Pearce and Blackledge has
been followed and expanded by other courts, further limiting prosecutorial
discretion with respect to subsequent charges against defendants. United States
v. Ruesga-Martinez"5 is illustrative and factually similar to the instant case. In
that case, the misdemeanant refused to waive his statutory right to a trial by
the district judge although he was encouraged by the prosecutor to do so.A0
The prosecutor then obtained a felony indictment to be used in the district
court proceeding. 37 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the convicSuccessfully Attacks His Guilty Plea: Double Jeopardy and Due Process Implications, 50
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 857 (1975).
29. 395 U.S. at 725. It should be noted that the Court in this case went so far as creating
a prophylactic rule to guard against the mere possibility of vindictiveness and the resultant
chill on the defendant's exercise of procedural rights when official discretion xesults in an
enhanced sentence.

30. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
31. North Carolina has a two-tiered appellate procedure that allows for such a trial. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-290 (1977).
32. 417 U.S. at 23. This is a good example of inherent prosecutorial discretion in the
charging function. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
33. 417 U.S. at 28-29.
34. Id. See also, United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935 (9th Cir. 1976) (an
attempt to retry an appellant and impose a heavier penalty for the same act is presumptively
vindictive); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (invalidating a first
degree murder charge which was made subsequent to a mistrial when the original charge had

been second degree murder); United States v. De Marco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(defendant could not be xeindicted upon a more serious charge when he exercised his procedural right to a change in venue); Safecheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Iowa 1969)
(subsequent conviction overturned where defendant pleaded guilty without the assistance of
counsel and a retrial was granted at which he was convicted of a more serious offense than
that originally charged).
35. 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir; 1976).

36. This right arises under 18 U.S.C. §3401(b) (1976).
37. 534 F.2d at 1370. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 747 (1970), established the power

to plea bargain but explicitly left this situation open. "We here make no reference to the
situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and
sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady's
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tion, stating that the retaliatory readjustment of charges is not inherent in the
prosecutor's power to plea bargain.38 The court also held that the prosecutor
bore the burden of showing that the harsher subsequent re-indictment was not
vindictive. 39 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the instant case, adopted
reasoning similar to that of Martinez and concluded that due process was
violated when the prosecutor's charging decision was influenced by the concessions he hoped to gain from the defendant in the course of plea negotiations.40 Rejecting this rationale, the Supreme Court in the instant case conceded that to "punish a person because he does what the law plainly allows
him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort." 41 In sharp contrast to preceding decisions, 42 however, this element of punishment was found
not to exist as long as the accused is free to make his own decisions regarding
his plea. 43 According to the Supreme Court, the "give and take" nature of plea
bargaining eliminates impermissible vindictiveness. 44 The Court further determined, as a practical matter, that within the plea bargain framework it
makes no difference whether a prosecutor grants concessions relating to an
already existing indictment in return for a guilty plea or seeks an enhanced
indictment if the accused persists in an innocent plea. 45 That a defendant will
be forced to make difficult choices and may therefore be discouraged from exercising his procedural rights was deemed inevitable if plea bargaining is to be
permitted. 46 The Court, however, expressed the belief that a defendant faced
with such choices would, with the advice of counsel, 47 be able to make an
intelligent and uncoerced decision. 4 8 Plea bargaining exists because of the
case there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified
by the evidence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted
after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty." Id. at 751 n.8.
38. 534 F.2d at 1370-71.
39. Id. at 1369.
40. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976). The lower court also concluded
that when the prosecutor did not initially bring a habitual offender indictment, although
he was aware of the fact that it could be brought, he waived his right to subsequently bring
the additional charge. His discretion was used when he originally determined that the
interests of the state were not best served by the bringing of the enhanced indictment and he
was not allowed to seek an increased charge merely as a tactical move during plea negotiations. Id. at 44.
41. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
42. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text.
43. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
44. Id. See also Note, Plea Bargainingand the Transformation of the Criminal Process,
90 HAuv. L. REv. 564, 576-79 (1977).
45. 98 S. Ct. at 666.
46. Id. at 668. See also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973).
47. Plea negotiations have been determined to be a critical stage at which the right to
counsel is constitutionally guaranteed. Brady v. United States, 897 U.S. 742, 758 (1970). But
see Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney, and The Guilty Plea, 47 U. CoLO.
L. RFv. 1, 55 (1975): "A guilty plea entered at gunpoint is no less involuntary because an
attorney is present to explain how the gun works."
48. 98 S. Ct. at 668. A guilty plea must be entered without coercion of any kind and must
be intelligent in the light of relevant circumstances. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
In the present case, the plea negotiations were conducted in the presence of the clerk of the
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"mutuality of advantage" to defendant and prosecutor, both of whom wish to
avoid trial.49 For example, in the instant case, the accused expected the court
to reduce the severity of his sentence, while the prosecutor expected to lessen
his workload.
In making its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that if a system tolerates and encourages plea negotiations as constitutionally legitimate, it must
face the simple reality that the prosecutor's objective then becomes the extraction of a guilty plea from the defendant.5 0 Although the proffered bargain
discouraged the exercise of the defendant's procedural rights, the prosecutor's
conscious decision to seek an enhanced indictment was found constitutionally
permissible because the defendant was clearly chargeable as an habitual offender, 5' and the prosecutor exercised lawful discretion in his decision to
prosecute under the habitual offender charge. 52 Justice Blackmun, however,

expressed in his dissenting opinion a belief that a prosecutor must justify an
enhanced indictment upon some basis other than that of discouraging the
defendant from the exercise of his procedural rights. 53
Noting that benefits potentially could have accrued to both prosecutor
and accused in the instant case, the Court was able to distinguish Pearce and
Blackledge as instances of retaliation by the state for the defendant's exercise
of procedural rights. 54 The instant Court saw Pearce and Blackledge as dealing
with "the unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who has chosen
to exercise his legal right to attack his original conviction."55 In contrast, the
Court found that the prosecutorial conduct in the instant case avoided such
court. 98 S. Ct. at 665. This may be seen as an added step taken by the state of Kentucky to
assure that pleas of guilty are in fact knowledgeable and voluntary.
49. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
50. Id. But see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935): "The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant 'of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor -indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETMcS No. 5: "The primary
duty of a -[prosecutor] is not to convict but to see that justice is done.. .
51. See note 5 supra.
52. 98 S. Ct. at 668. See generally K. DAvis, DXS CsE[ONARY JUsTIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQunRY (1969).
53. 98 S.Ct. at 670.
54. 98 S. Ct. at 667. Blackledge and Pearce were the dispositive cases used by the lower
court to conclude that prosecutorial vindictiveness was a violation of due process. Hayes v.
Cowan, 547 F.2d ,42,44 (6th Cir. 1976): "In .Blackledge the Court applied the rule expressed
in Pearce to protect defendants from the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discretion....
The Court emphasized [in Blackledge] that the prosecution should not be allowed to behave
in a manner that even suggests a retaliatory motive." The lower court further determined
that the admitted vindictiveness in the instant case was sufficient in itself to constitute a
denial of due process. Id.
55. 98 S. Ct. at 667.
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unilateral imposition of penalties.5 6 The Court recognized that the defendant57
negotiating his plea possessed power substantially equal to that of the state.
The Court determined that the "give and take" of plea bargaining prevents
the possibility of impermissible coercion. 5s If this "give and take" nature is
analogized to bargaining pursuant to making a contract, it appears that the
Court may have improperly overlooked an application of the principles of
undue influence. 59 Yet it is also clear that the fundamental rights inherent in
the criminal process are substantially different and therefore are not closely
analogous to the rights of contracting parties.
The holding in the present case can be rationalized on the basis of two
pragmatic considerations. First, it is desirable to maintain the newly achieved
status and visibility of plea bargaining. 60 Implicit throughout the entire majority opinion is a general policy objective of protecting the practice of plea
bargaining. The Court observed that "whatever might be the situation in an
ideal world, the fact is that a guilty plea and the often concomitant plea
bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system.
Properly administered they can benefit all concerned." 61 The Court has apparently taken judicial notice of the generally held belief that absent plea
bargaining, the present criminal justice structure would face an immediate
collapse. 62 Consequently, due to the implicitly recognized possibility of col56. Id.
57. Id. The rationale of the instant case also seems to have implications as to the
validity of cases similar to Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1975). In Boyd a prisoner
was required to sign a release of civil liability prior to the dropping of criminal charges
against her. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and determined
that the release was void because it was inherently coerced and against public policy. 513 F.2d
at 88.
58. Id. at 668.
59. See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891);
Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson, Co., 435 F.2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1970) (the test is no
longer whether a man of ordinary courage would yield to the threat but whether the threat
has left the individual "bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making of a contract").
See also Alschuler, supra note 47, at 65:
60. 98 S. Ct. at 669: "[A wcontrary ruling] would drive the practice of plea bargaining
back into the shadows from which it has so recently emerged." See also Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
61. 98 S. Ct. at 667. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this statement is that
unfortunately the decisions of courts in the present criminal justice system are necessarily
being controlled by circumstances and not by choice.
62. 98 S. Ct. at 667. With respect to the plea bargain system, a former assistant state's
attorney has said: "It's wrong when the ends of justice are not truly served. But it is right in
the sense that another case has been disposed of and the court system has moved another
case away from potential collapse." Comment, supra note 15, at 516. It has been estimated
that if every defendant chose to exercise his procedural right to a trial, two out of three
cases would have to be dismissed because of the inability of the present system to meet
statutory deadlines for trials. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT (1975). See also ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, table
53 at 264 (1975) (31,170 of the 48,244 cases filed in the federal district courts in 1975 were
disposed of through guilty pleas). Earlier estimates had placed the number of guilty pleas in
both state and federal courts at over 90%. See, e.g., D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DmrEtMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE. WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966).
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lapse the Court has taken a determined protective stance with regard to the
plea bargain process. 63 Second, the majority and dissent in the instant case both
recognized the fact that a contrary holding could easily be avoided by prosecutorial subterfuge.64 A prosecutor looking towards the possibility of plea
negotiations could, as a matter of course, indict upon every available charge in
the first instance.6s
In the present case the Court made a quantum leap from recognition of the
fact of prosecutorial discretion to recognition of its justified use as a tactical
tool to induce a plea of guilty.66 The mere existence of discretion is the sole
predicate provided by the Court for its selective use as a tool in the plea
bargain framework.67 The conceptual problem with this analysis is that the
role of the prosecutor becomes entirely adversarial and the ultimate goal of
the state is reduced to the achievement of a maximum conviction rate rather
than the achievement of justice.65
However, in certain respects any decrease in prosecutorial discretion could
create an injustice. Strict guidelines may result in the prosecution of marginal
or minimal offenses.6 9 Within this gray area prosecutorial discretion serves its
most useful function7 0 Yet those defendants charged with marginal offenses
are the ones most likely to be harmed by the instant decision. Presumably a
weak state case implies a greater likelihood of the accused's innocence. The
use of threats may therefore have the undesirable effect of causing an innocent
1
defendant, fearful of a more serious charge, to plead guilty7
63. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
64. Id. at 668, 670. T ie dissenting justice, however, felt that this fact should make no

difference in the instant decision, stating that the Court has never sancti'oried the process of
overcharging., Nevertheless, the opinion goes on- to conclude that "[if] overcharging is t6 be
sanctioned; there ar6 strong reasons 6f fairness why the charges should be presented at' the
beginning of the bargaining process, rather than as a filliped threat at the end." Id. at 670
n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). These "reasons of fairness" are that the prosecutor would then
have to reach a charging decision without knowing how a defendant would plead, the
charging practices would remain, more visible, and the defendant wotld be able to more

readily determine the validity of an enhanced charge. Idi
65. 98 S. Ct. at 670. "It might be argued that it really makes little difference how this
-ase, 'now that it is here, is decided.... A contrary result, merely would prompf the ag-

gressive prosecutor to bring the greater charge initially in every case, and only thereafter to
bargain." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also' Comment, supra note 7, at 710-11.
66. 98 S. Ct. at 668.
67. Id.
68. See generally H. PACKER, THE Limrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), in which the

author generally determined that efficiency is one of the sacrifices that proponents of the due
process model must be willing to accept. He further indicated that ultimately a goal of
11
maximal efficiency results in maximal tyranny in terms of due process rights. Id. at 166.
69. The problems created by strict guidelines could, however, be overcome by the in-

stitution of a magisterial model of prosecution determination. Under this 'system, the
prosecutor would file all charges and a magistrate would independently investigate the
charges and determine further disposition of the case. This 'system is generally used in continental Europe. See Note, supra note 44, at 575.

70. See Comment, supra note 7, at 710-11.
71. ALI, A MODEL CODE OF RE ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §350.3, Commentary at 608
(1975). See also Note, supra note 44, at 573-82.
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A potential deleterious effect of the use of prosecutorial discretion as a
means of obtaining a guilty plea is that the ultimate sentence received is no
longer determined by culpability or relevant penological considerations. Instead, a defendant will receive a more severe sentence merely because he
chooses to assert his innocence.7 2 Some justification for a lesser sentence received in a plea bargain may be seen by conceptualizing the guilty plea as a
sign of repentance.7 3 Yet this justification should not be used as a basis for
consistently imposing heavier sentences on defendants who choose to plead
innocent. Because the Court in the instant case was implicitly concerned with
legitimizing the plea bargain process, 74 the instant holding may be seen as
anamalous if the ultimate sentence received by a defendant as a result of this
7 5
process is irrationally determined.
The instant Court determined that there are, in fact, constitutional limitations on the use of prosecutorial discretion within the plea bargain process. 76
These limits, however, are not delineated in the opinion. 77 Moreover, the
instant decision was formultaed so narrowly as to offer little guidance as to
the nature of any constitutional limitation.7 The decision in point, therefore,
has done very little to provide substantial criteria by which the validity of
various plea bargains can be determined.7 9 Thus, it becomes inevitable that
further litigation must determine the constitutional perimeters of prosecutorial
discretion in the plea baragin process.
The curent criminal justice process depends upon a steady flow of guilty
pleas because there are simply not enough facilities or personnel for a significant percentage of defendants to go to trial1 0 Given the indispensable nature
of plea negotiations,8 ' it is preferable to make the process visible so that it may
be sufficiently regulated.8 2 Magisterial supervision, together with provisions for
significant defendant participation, would contribute immensely to the legitimacy of plea bargains.8 3 Specific controls s 4 and legislation such as that
72. See D. NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 225-26.
73. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). See also Note, supra note 44, at 577
n.8. It has been further determined that a plea of guilty tends to show that a defendant will
be more responsive to rehabilitation as a result of reconciliation to his punishment. Id.
74. 98 S.Ct. at 668.
75. 98 S. Ct. at 672 (Powell, J., dissenting) "I think it may be inferred that the prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not in the public interest to put this defendant
in jeopardy of a sentence of life imprisonment." Id.
76. 98 S. Ct. at 669.
77. Id.
78. Id. "We hold only that the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this
case... did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
79. See note 85 infra. See generally Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and
Defense Personnel:A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11 (1966).
80. See note 44 supra.
81. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
82. See ABA PROJEcT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING
TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968). See also D. NEWMAN, supra note 62.
83. See Note, supra note 44, at 593-94.
84. See Note, supra note 44 (proposing a magisterial/participation model as the vehicle
for the control of the plea bargain process). The model provides for a magistrate to assure
that the plea has a basis in fact and to provide for a degree of sentence rationality. The
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promulgated by the American Law Institute in A Model Code of Pre-arraign-

ment Procedure5 would provide the needed standards for the plea bargain
process.
Although the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case place
the prosecutor's actions in an unfavorable light,88 the ruling is palatable in
terms of pragmatic considerations and a division of legislative and judicial
responsibility. Yet such decisions are an unsatisfactory solution to the problem.:
The necessary and beneficial control87 of the plea bargain process will be best
achieved not by case law pursuant to broad constitutional principles, but by
specific curative legislation.
E. LANNY RussELL
function of the magistrate creates the needed formal barrier to conviction. This model also
provides for defendant participation to assure that his interests are in fact represented. This
procedure would provide for more legitimacy in the plea bargain process relative to the
defendant's submission to the ultimate sentence received. See also ABA PRoJacr ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 254-55 (Approved
Draft 1968) (Noting importance of defendant making a statement on his own behalf at time
of sentencing).
85. ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE ARRAiGNmE= PROCEDURE §350.3 (1975):
Procedure for Plea Discussions
(1) Plea Conference. At the request of either party, the parties shall mneet to discuss the
possibility that upon the defendant's entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to one
or more offenses, the prosecutor will not charge, will dismiss or will move for the dismissal
of other charges, or will recommend or not oppose a particular sentence. The defendant
must be represented by counsel in such discussions and the defendant need not be present.
The court shall not participate in such discussions.
(2) Prosecutor's Regulations. Each prosecution office in the state shall issue regulations
pursuant to Section 10.3 setting forth guidelines and procedures with respect to plea discussions and plea agreements designed to afford similarly situated defendants equal opportunities for plea discussions and plea agreements.
(3)Improper Pressure. The prosecutor shall not seek to induce a plea of guilty or .olo
contendere by exerting such undue pressures as: (a) charging or threatening to charge the
defendant with a crime not supported by facts believed by the prosecutor to be provable;
(b) charging or threatening to charge the defendant with a crime not ordinarily charged
in the jurisdiction for the conduct allegedly engaged in by him; or (c) threatening the
defendant that if he pleads not guilty, his sentence may be more severe than that which is
ordinarily imposed in the jurisdiction in similar cases on defendants who plead not
guilty....
86. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
87. Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty Plea, ANNALS 75 (Nov. 1967): "In many courts the
guilty plea process looks more like the purchase of a rug in a Lebanese bazaar than like the
confrontation between a man and his soul:'
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